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ABSTRACT
In 2010, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. destabilized the
world of securities litigation by denying those who purchased their securities
outside the U.S. the ability to sue in the U.S. (as they had previously often
done). Nature, however abhors a vacuum, and practitioners and other
jurisdictions began to seek ways to regain access to U.S. courts. Several
techniques have emerged: (1) expanding settlement classes so that they are
broader than litigation classes and treating the location of the transaction as
strictly a merits issue that defendants could waive; (2) adopting U.S. law as
applicable to securities issued abroad by cross-listed companies (as Israel has
done); (3) use of the Netherland’sWCAM statute to effect a global resolution
of a settlement class; and (4) coordination between the courts in both
jurisdictions in the case of a cross-listed stock. On the horizon is still a more
ambitious technique: use of supplemental jurisdiction to permit a class of
foreign claimants to be combined with a class of U.S. claimants. Early
decisions have divided on this technique. This article suggests guidelines
for courts to follow in whether to allow foreign claimants in securities actions
to re-enter the U.S.
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................2




C. The Netherlands and WCAM............................................13
D. Petrobras and the Expansion of Settlement Classes..........16
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction .................................................18
III. HOW TOBALANCE PROMISE AND PERIL .......................................20
*
Professor Coffee is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law
School and Director of Columbia Law School’s Center on Corporate Governance.
2 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
A. Protections Against Collusion...........................................21
1. Subclassing and Independent Counsel ........................21
2. Comity .........................................................................22
B. Should the U.S. Become a Forum for Global Resolution?
...........................................................................................23
1. The Friendly Rationale ................................................24
2. Defendant’s Interests ...................................................25
3. Uniformity in Legal Standards ....................................25
C. A Proposed Balance ..........................................................26
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................27
I. INTRODUCTION
“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.”
—Lord Denning
1
Always controversial and much debated,
2
the world of securities
litigation was destabilized in 2010 when the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
3
Previously, under a long
established “conduct or effect” test, it had been possible for a U.S. court to
resolve securities fraud claims raised by purchasers or sellers who were
neither U.S. citizens nor residents — at least if either the securities
transaction occurred in the U.S. (such as on a U.S. exchange) or substantial
conduct in the planning or implementation of the fraud took place in the U.S.
4
Although the number of such “global” securities class actions so resolved by
1. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Block (1983) 1 WLR 730 at 733 (Eng.).
2. This article does not consider the continuing debate over whether the securities class
action truly achieves compensation or deterrence for its class members. For a recent critique,
see Note, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2019).
3. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). There is now a considerable literature on the impact of
Morrison, but no clear consensus. One view is thatMorrison has slightly reduced the risk of
litigation for foreign firms, but chiefly made that risk more ascertainable. SeeYuliya Guseva,
Extraterritoriality of Securities Law Redux: Litigation Five Years After Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 199, 279 (2017).
4. This doctrine derived from two important decisions of Judge Henry Friendly of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
1975) and Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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U.S. courts was actually small, several settlements or judgments just prior to
Morrison had each exceeded $1 billion and raised deep anxieties in the
business community.
5
In any event, Morrison, reversed this “conduct or effect” test and held
that the antifraud provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws reached only
securities transactions that occurred in the U.S. This made the location of
the trade critical, and many litigants formerly covered were now barred from
recovery in U.S. courts. To illustrate, if a stock were cross-listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and the stock exchange of any of London, Toronto or
Tel Aviv, the claims of those shareholders who had purchased on the non-
U.S. exchange could not be included in the U.S. class action (and thus they
could seemingly not share in the settlement). Perhaps, these purchasers
could sue in their own country or some other country where the stock was
listed, but most of the world lacks a U.S. style “opt-out” class action that
covers all class members who do not formally exit the action (or “opt out” in
the parlance). Thus, most foreign shareholders, including those holding
“negative value” claims,
6
were simply out of luck.
That was the starting point. The focus of this article is not Morrison,
but the reaction to it. Relatively quickly, practitioners and other nations
responded to Morrison, by seeking means by which their clients (much like
Lord Denning’s moth) could find a way back into the United States. Because
foreign investors, particularly institutional ones, had become accustomed to
participating in U.S. securities class actions (and receiving their share of the
settlement without having to make any out-of-pocket payment), they
5. Three cases stand out. First, in In re Royal Ahold N.V. Securities &ERISA Litigation.,
No. 1:03-MD-01539, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, at *48 (D. Md. June 16, 2006), the
settlement was $1.1 billion, and the class was global, based on allegations that the fraud was
planned in the United States. Second, in In re Nortel Networks Corp. Securities Litigation,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15702 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003), the plaintiff class consisted of U.S.
and Canadian investors, and the total settlement came to $2.9 billion. Finally, in In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 242 F.R.D. 76, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), the class consisted
of persons from the U.S., France, England, and the Netherlands who acquired ordinary shares
or American Depository Shares of Vivendi, and the preliminary judgment came to over $9
billion (this decision was ultimately reversed based onMorrison). For a review of these cases,
see Robert P. Bartlett, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Myth
of Morrison: Securities Fraud Litigation Against Foreign Issuers (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law
& Econs., Research Paper No. 18-34, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283527 [https://perm
a.cc/TH9K-9GHE]. Some of these cases were “f-cubed” cases, in which the plaintiffs, the
defendants, and the trading were all foreign to the U.S. Morrison was such a case, and most
expected the Court to reject “f-cubed” cases, but the Court wrote far more broadly.
6. “Negative value” claims are legal claims that, although meritorious, would cost the
plaintiff more to enforce than the recovery would provide the plaintiff. In part, this is the
product of the “American rule” under which each side bears its own legal costs.
4 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
understandably wanted either a substitute forum or a way to participate in
U.S. settlements. Nature, it is said, abhors a vacuum, and a consequence of
Morrison was the appearance of a seeming vacuum to which plaintiff’s
attorneys across a variety of jurisdictions responded with various attempts to
fill the void. The clearest reactions to Morrison were in Canada and Israel,
two jurisdictions with high numbers of companies cross-listed in the U.S.
7
In Israel, which has a particularly large number of firms cross-fitted in the
U.S. for the size of its economy,Morrison seems to have provoked a change
in Israeli law.
8
Another important consequence ofMorrison has been the increased use
of the Netherland’s WCAM statute.
9
That statute, originally enacted to deal
with mass tort cases, permits a settlement class covering foreign plaintiffs to
be filed and approved in the Netherlands so long as there is at least a token
Netherlands plaintiff. Although the WCAM statute seemingly enables a
global class to be resolved, it permits only a settlement class, not a litigation
class. Thus, one can settle, but not sue, under WCAM.
This ability to settle when you cannot be sued raises a special danger:
defendants may seek to reach a collusive (and cheap) settlement on a global
basis in order to forestall litigation in a variety of forums. By offering
lucrative attorney’s fees to class counsel for a cheap settlement, defendants
may be able to achieve this goal. That was the danger that the U.S. Supreme
Court foresaw in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
10
in which Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority, observed, citing this author, that a
plaintiff who could only settle and not sue was “disarmed” and might not be
able to provide adequate representation to the class.
11
Since Amchem,
7. For an overview as of 2010 of the reaction in Canada, see Adam C. Pritchard & Janis
P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of
Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 881 (2010). As of February 21, 2019,
Israel had forty issuers listed on NASDAQ and twelve listed on the NYSE (for a total of fifty-
two such cross-listed issuers). Only three Israeli companies are listed on the London Stock
Exchange. SeeMarket Data: Dual Listed Companies, TELAVIVSTOCKEXCHANGE, https://inf
o.tase.co.il/Eng/MarketData/Stocks/MarketData/Pages/MarketData.aspx?action=2&dualTab
=&SubAction=&Date=&issubmitted=1 [https://perma.cc/3WVE-U7VW] (last visited Feb.
21, 2019).
8. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
9. “WCAM” stands for Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade (or “Act on
Collective Settlement of Mass Claims”). For a brief overview, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1895, 1905–07 (2017).
10. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
11. 521 U.S. at 621 (“[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification,
eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of
litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to
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plaintiffs have devised a variety of strategies, with some success, to steer
around this decision, but Amchem remains the primary barrier in the U.S. to
attempts to arrange settlement classes that work better for defendants than
for the class members.
Collusion is, however, only one side of the coin; the other side is that
many claimants in much of the world have no effective remedy, given that
they hold “negative value” claims and no class action is authorized in their
jurisdiction. For example, the United Kingdom lacks a class action
applicable to securities fraud claims, and its citizens who traded in a U.S.
issuer’s stock on a U.K. exchange are without a practical legal remedy.
12
Thus, a settlement class brought in the Netherlands under the WCAM statute
could be at the same time “fair” to U.K. citizens and “unfair” to Canadian
citizens (who do have a class action remedy available to them). Fairness is
to some degree in the eye of the beholder.
One further recent development looms particularly large. U.S. counsel
may have found a way to outflank Morrison and could be on the verge of
exploiting this new technique. In In re Petrobras Securities Litigation,
13
United States District Judge Jed Rakoff last year approved a $3 billion
settlement against Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company, which settlement
stands as the fifth largest U.S. securities class action settlement on record
and the largest involving a foreign issuer. But before that settlement was
approved, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the most experienced U.S.
court in securities litigation, had first rejected an earlier attempt to certify the
class.
14
Although the Second Circuit upheld Judge Rakoff on a number of
difficult issues, it found that there was insufficient evidence as to where
Petrobras’s bonds had traded. Unlike Petrobras’s common stock, which had
clearly traded on the NYSE (and thus was within the scope ofMorrison), the
bonds could have traded outside the U.S. (such as in Brazil), even though
settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer, see
Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343,
1379-1380 (1995). . . .”).
12. The U.K. does have a procedure for “collective securities actions” brought under
Section 90 and 90A of the Financial Services andMarkets Act 2000. Claimants are organized
into a collective action (which resembles an “opt-in” class action) pursuant to a Group
Litigation Order (or “GLO”) entered pursuant to Part 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules. These
have recently been used in several major cases by large investors, mainly institutions. See
Matt Getz & Peter Barnett, Collective Action and Securities Law in the U.K.: Recent and
Anticipated Developments and International Trends, BUTTERWORTH’S J. INT’L BANKING &
FIN. L., May 2017, at 299-301. The U.K. has no “opt-out” procedure, which tends to be the
only procedure that benefits smaller shareholders.
13. 317 F. Supp. 3d 858 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
14. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2017).
6 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
these bonds still had to clear through the Depository Trust Company
(“DTC”) in New York in order to qualify for the settlement. Thus, this
possibility of trading outside the U.S. implicatedMorrison, and, more to the
point, raised an “individual” issue as to the location of each bond’s trade.
Under the procedural rules applicable to class actions in the United States, a
class can be certified only if the common issues of law and fact
“predominate” over the individual issues.
15
Because the location of these
bond trades (or, in the parlance, their “domesticity”) was an individual issue
that had to be decided with respect to each individual trade, the Second
Circuit reversed Judge Rakoff’s certification order and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceeding to see if other evidence as to the
bonds’ domesticity could be obtained.
This ruling seemed to imply that the Petrobras bonds (unlike the
Petrobras common stock) could not be included in the class. But, on remand,
the case took an unusual turn. The parties simply agreed to settle and to
include the disputed bonds within the settlement. Did this defy the appellate
court’s ruling? Judge Rakoff held that it did not, finding that the issue of
“domesticity” did not relate to subject matter jurisdiction, but only to the
merits. Defendants, he said, could waive any issue as to the merits, but not
issues as to subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the district court was simply
repeating a point that Morrison, itself, had stressed: extraterritoriality went
to the merits, not the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Earlier Second
Circuit decisions had also made this same point in allowing the defendant to
waive defenses and achieve certification. Thus, Judge Rakoff upheld and
approved as a settlement class an action that he could not have heard as a
litigation class (if the defendant objected).
The bottom line here is that these decisions appear to give the defendant
great discretion over whether cases that cannot be certified as litigation
classes can be instead certified as settlement classes. If defendants have
broad discretion in this regard, the likelihood is high that they may use this
power to agree to a settlement class chiefly when the settlement terms favor
it and undercompensate the class. Plaintiff’s counsel, having no ability to
get to trial and thus being “disarmed,” may agree to such a settlement either
because (a) it is the best that the class can get, or (b) the fees the plaintiff’s
attorneys will receive if the settlement is approved more than adequately
compensate them (although not the class).
15. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires in the case of a class
action seeking monetary damages that the common issues of law and fact “predominate” over
the individual issues. The location of each trade (i.e., whether it was domestic or foreign)
would be an individual issue, thus precluding certification, unless common evidence could
establish the location of all trades by class members.
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In truth, this is precisely the same problem that the WCAM statute also
raises. If the only route to a recovery is through a settlement class,
defendants have a veto power over the terms of the settlement and may
exploit that power to insist on a cheap settlement far below the settlement
that would have negotiated if a litigation class could have been certified.
To be sure, the facts of Petrobras do not reveal any such overreaching.
The case only went marginally beyond the outer limits of the earlier litigation
class to the extent that the location of some of the trading in the Petrobras’s
bonds was uncertain. This was not a case where common shares traded on
the London or Brazilian exchanges were dumped into the class alongside the
NYSE-traded common stock. Further, all of the lead plaintiffs in the case
(several of whom held only U.S.-traded securities) had approved the
expansion of the class, apparently because they believed any attempt to
divide the Petrobras bonds into two categories (i.e., those traded in the U.S.
versus those traded elsewhere) would have been prohibitively expensive.
Nonetheless, the Petrobras decision raises the question of whether in
some future case the parties could extend a settlement class to cover
securities that clearly could not have been included in the litigation class.
For example, could equity securities of Petrobras traded on the London Stock
Exchange have been similarly included? No clear, bright-line limit
precluding such an expansion is immediately apparent.
16
Legal change
comes incrementally, but once the expansion in the scope of the class was
approved based on the use of a settlement class, further efforts to extend the
class’s scope by this technique in future cases become foreseeable.
At this point, a roadmap for this article is in order. Part II will begin by
looking at legal developments in two countries (Canada and Israel) where
cross-border securities litigation has increased — probably because these
countries both have a significant number of companies that are cross-listed
in the U.S. and also recognize an American-style “opt out” class action.
Then, it will turn to the recent use of the WCAM statute in the Netherlands
as a means to resolve securities litigation that cannot be resolved in the U.S.
Finally, it will examine the implications of the Petrobras litigation in the
U.S. on the possible outer reaches of settlement classes in the U.S. and then
survey the possible use of supplemental jurisdiction. The common question
is whether what Morrison took away can be restored. Lastly, Part III will
then survey possible limitations and compromises, given that both promise
and peril surround the use of settlement classes to achieve global resolution.
16. As discussed later, if there is a material difference in claim strength, a “fundamental
conflict” may exist between the U.S. and the foreign claimants (that is, those who traded
outside the U.S.) which would require subclassing and separate counsel. See infra notes 48–
49 and accompanying text.
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II. CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION: HOWMANYWAYSARE THERE
TO SKIN THEMORRISONCAT?
Two nations—Canada and Israel—share (1) a significant number of
companies incorporated in their jurisdiction and cross-listed on a U.S.
exchange, and (2) legal rules that permit a procedure functionally equivalent
to an American “opt out” class action. The presence of these two factors
distinguishes them from other countries (for example, the United Kingdom)
that have many companies cross-listed in the U.S. but no class action
procedure (at least none applicable to securities fraud cases). Given that a
local class action procedure was available, it should not surprise that, in
response to Morrison, plaintiff’s attorneys in each jurisdiction used their
class action device to represent local residents who, because they had
purchased the securities of cross-listed firms on their own country’s
exchange, could no longer participate in a U.S. class action settlement. It
was also unsurprising that bolder attorneys, anticipating the prospect of a
larger recovery (and hence a large attorney’s fee), sought to represent
investors in a domestically incorporated firm on a global basis. Immediately,
this raised the prospection of competition between the domestic class action
and the U.S. class action, and the resolution of each is inevitably affected by
the other. As next discussed, courts in both Canada and Israel have been
sensitive to this problem — but in different ways.
A. Canada
Canada did not provide a legal remedy for secondary market purchasers
until 2005 when Ontario enacted legislation that has now been subsequently
adopted in a similar form by most of the other major Canadian provinces.
17
Previously, only those who bought in the primary market (i.e., from the
issuer or its underwriters) had a statutory cause of action. This statutory
revision made it possible to bring in Canada the classic U.S.-style “stock
drop” class action covering all persons who had purchased a Canadian
issuer’s shares based on allegedly materially false information.
Canadian plaintiff’s attorneys were not slow in seeking to exploit this
new opportunity. The first significant case that revealed the potential for
conflict between U.S. and Canadian class actions was Silver v. IMAX.
18
17. See Pritchard & Sarra, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that five other Canadian provinces
followed Ontario by 2008).
18. There have been a host of decisions in both the U.S. and Canada. For the U.S.
decisions, see In re IMAX Securities Litigation, 587 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re
IMAX Securities Litigation, 272 F.R.D. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re IMAX Securities
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Following a financial restatement by this firm that had pioneered a special
film technology, overlapping class actions were filed in both the U.S. and
Canada. The U.S. case proceeded more quickly, and a tentative settlement
was reached. But the problem with achieving a settlement was that the
Canadian action purported to represent many of the same class members, and
the defendant issuer did not want to face the prospect of additional liability
to the same class members after they were paid under the U.S. settlement.
To reach a resolution, the U.S. and Canadian judges conferred and came to
an agreement: the U.S. court made its approval of the settlement contingent
on an amendment of the Canadian class definition to exclude all plaintiffs
bound by the U.S. decision.
19
The Canadian court accepted this
compromise.
20
As a practical matter, this informal resolution produced the
equivalent of a global class action, because virtually all shareholders of
IMAX Corp. were covered by one of the two settlements. Both courts
approved the settlement as fair and reasonable.
Morrison probably simplified the border warfare that had begun to
erupt between U.S. and Canadian class actions because it was no longer
possible for U.S. class actions to cover Canadians — unless they had
purchased on the U.S. exchanges (as often they had). Still, Canadian counsel
could “poach” class members that were lawfully within the U.S. class
definition. For example, a Canadian class definition could seek to cover all
shareholders of a Canadian class action or less ambitiously, all Canadian
citizen or residents, even if they purchased on a U.S. exchange. The
resolution in Silver v. IMAX Corp was not a broad decision that Canadian
courts would not cover Canadians who purchased in the U.S., but was more
narrowly based on the fact that a tentative settlement had been reached in the
U.S. case, and neither court wanted to delay the distribution of the proceeds
to the class members in that case (which of course included Canadians who
had purchased on U.S. exchanges).
This prospect of an attempt to base a global class action in Canada came
into view in 2018 in Yip v. HSBC Holdings plc.
21
In Yip, the plaintiff sought
to sue HSBC Holdings, the parent holding company of HSBC, which is
headquartered in London and active globally. Neither HSBC Holdings nor
Litigation, 283 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). For the Canadian decisions, see Silver v. IMAX
Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5285 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); Silver v. IMAX Corp. (2011), 105
O.R. 3d 212 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Silver v. IMAX Corp., 2013 ONSC 1667 (Can). As a
matter of full disclosure, the author points out that he was an expert witness for IMAX in the
Canadian litigation.
19. See In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 283 F.R.D. 178, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
20. See Silver v. IMAX Corp., 2013 ONSC 1667.
21. 2018 ONCA 626 (Can.). As a matter of full disclosure, the author points out that he
was an expert witness for HSBC in this litigation.
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HSBC trades or has even been listed in Canada, and the plaintiff purchased
his shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. HSBC Holdings does not
operate in Canada, although HSBC does have Canadian branches. Under the
Ontario statute, investors have a statutory cause of action against any
“reporting issuer” (which HSBC Holdings was not) and “any other issuer
with a real and substantial connection” to the province.
22
Yip thus posed the
question of what facts would demonstrate a “real and substantial
connection.”
23
Had plaintiffs succeeded in Yip, Canada might have become a forum in
which virtually any major multinational corporation could have been sued.
This would have been a shock, particularly to U.S. corporations, because the
Canadian provincial securities statutes have a pro-plaintiff tilt, not requiring
the plaintiff to prove either scienter or reliance (while U.S. law does).
Unsurprisingly, this effort to make Canada a base for global securities
litigation failed. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the lower court, which
had ruled that jurisdiction must be based on one of four “presumptive
connecting factors” for tort claims: (1) the defendant is domiciled or resident
in the province; (2) the defendant carries on business in the province; (3) the
tort was committed in the province; or (4) a contract connected with the
dispute was made in the province.
24
Specifically, Yip held that a foreign
holding company that supervises a global enterprise does not “carry on
business” in Canada.
25
Nor did the fact that Canadian investors could access
this company’s disclosure online in Ontario establish jurisdiction.
26
Rather,
before a corporation may be said to carry on business in Ontario (and
presumably most other Canadian provinces whose statutes are similar), it
must have a physical presence in the jurisdiction that is accompanied by a
degree of sustained business activity.
27
Arguably, these standards are comparatively expansive and would
appear to permit many foreign corporations to be sued in Canada, even if
they are not listed on Canadian exchanges. Thus, it is important that Yip also
noted that a defendant may rebut plaintiff’s showing of these presumptive
connecting factors by showing that there is a clearly more appropriate forum
for the dispute. Looking to Canadian decisions on forum non conveniens
22. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.
23. For an overview of the Canadian law at issue in Yip, see Byron Shaw, Canadian
Jurisdiction over Cross-Border Securities Claims, A.B.A. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/practice/2018/canadian-jurisd
iction-over-cross-border-securities-claims/ [https://perma.cc/P9BU-792A].
24. Yip v. HSBC Holdings plc, 2017 ONSC 5332 (Can.), aff’d, 2018 ONCA 626.
25. 2018 ONCA 626, para. 41.
26. 2017 ONSC 5332, para. 39.
27. 2017 ONSC 5332, para. 159.
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doctrine, Yip expressed a broad sympathy for the proposition that “[T]he
more appropriate forum for secondary market claims will often favour the
forum of the exchange(s) where the securities trade.”
28
The most recent Canadian decision takes Yip a step further. This 2018
case, Leon v. Volkswagen AG,
29
involved an attempted securities class action
in Ontario against Volkswagen relating to the “defeat device” that
Volkswagen allegedly installed in its diesel automobiles to circumvent
emission control testing. Volkswagen, however, never traded nor listed in
Canada.
30
The plaintiff bought American Deposit Receipts (“ADRs”)
through a Canadian broker who executed the order in the U.S. After initially
attempting to sue in the U.S., the plaintiff withdrew when he was not selected
as lead plaintiff and commenced an action in Ontario. The Ontario Superior
Court rejected his suit on both jurisdictional and forum non conveniens
grounds, stating:
There is nothing unfair in expecting Ontario residents who
purchase a foreign company’s shares on a foreign exchange
(because the shares do not trade in Canada) to litigate their claims
against this foreign defendant in the jurisdiction of the foreign
exchange.
31
Commentators have seen this decision as a de facto endorsement of
Morrison.
32
This expressed preference for looking to the location of the trading
market may, however, be subject to one limitation. In Excalibur Special
Opportunities LP v. Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP.,
33
the Ontario Court of
Appeals did permit a class action to proceed in Ontario, even though the
issuer was a foreign company (incorporated in Nevada) that operated in
China. Of the 57 investors who purchased stock in this company in a private
placement, only two were from Canada and only one was fromOntario. 98%
of the class members were thus non-residents of Ontario. Why then was this
action allowed to proceed? The answer appears to be that the defendant was
28. 2018 ONCA 626, para. 75. See also Kaynes v. BP, PLC, 2014 ONCA 580.
29. Leon v. Volkswagen AG, 2018 ONSC 4265 (Can.).
30. Id. at para. 2.
31. Id. at para. 1.
32. Brendan O’Grady & Sarah Faber, No Trading Places: Securities Class Actions
Should Be Heard Where the Securities Were Sold, GLOBAL CLASS & COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
(Oct. 1, 2018), www.globalclassactionsblog.com/?s=No+Trading+Places%3A+Securities+C
lass+Actions+Should+Be+Heard+Where+the+Securities+Were+Sold [https://perma.cc/J9D
Y-KFF9].
33. 2016 ONCA 916 (Can.). The issuer was as Chinese hog farm (whose financial
statements had clearly been materially overstated) that was riding a bubble in Chinese stock
offerings.
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the Ontario auditor who prepared the issuer’s audit report, and it had done so
in Ontario.
34
In overview, this outcome looks as if Judge Friendly’s “conduct
test” survives in Canada.
35
The real fraud in the court’s viewwas the reckless
audit in Canada. Hence, Canada may follow both Morrison and Judge
Friendly with respect to jurisdiction to adjudicate.
In any event, the bottom line is that, in the wake ofMorrison, Canadian
courts modified their law, accepting the idea of jurisdiction based on the
location of the trade and thereby making it easier to settle U.S. securities
class actions involving dual-listed Canadian companies. But for this change,
securities class actions settled in U.S. courts might have had to exclude
Canadian shareholders who traded in the U.S. to preclude their participation
in both Canadian and U.S. class actions. The change thus benefitted
Canadian investors.
B. Israel
Israel is believed to have the largest number of class actions on a per
capita basis of any nation in the world.
36
In its recent decisions, Israel seems
also to be deferring to the U.S., while also finding a means to assure that
Israeli citizens will have a forum in which they can raise claims that are today
barred from U.S. courts by Morrison. In Cohen v. Tower Semiconductor
Ltd.
37
the Israel Supreme Court was faced with an Israeli company that was
34. Canadian commentary on this case has stressed that “the action involved claims
relating to [an] audit report that was prepared in Ontario against the defendant auditor that
resided and carried on Business in Ontario.” Christina Doria, No Jurisdictional Restraint
Required: Ontario Court of Appeal Certifies Global Class Action, GLOBAL CLASS &
COLLECTIVEACTIONS (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.globalclassactionsblog.com/2017/02/24/n
o-jurisdictional-restraint-required-ontario-court-of-appeal-certifies-global-class-action/ [http
s://perma.cc/U8KU-54MM]. This, it said, satisfied three of the four presumptive connecting
factors set out in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 (Can.). Still, this seems to
give decisive importance to conduct within the province.
35. For Judge Friendly’s “conduct” test, see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., supra note
4; see also ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
36. See Alon Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United States and Israel:
A Comparative Approach, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 151, 152 (2018) (noting that “about
1400” class actions were filed each year in Israel, which has a population of roughly 8 million,
whereas 12,500 class actions were annually filed in state and federal courts in the United
States with a population of 319 million).
37. Civil Appeal 2889/18 (Oct. 16, 2018). The decision was on an appeal of the ruling
of the District Court at Tel Aviv-Yato (Judge Khaled Kabub) in Cohen v. Tower
Semiconductor Ltd., C.A. 44775-02-16 (Nov. 7, 2017). This appeal was unified with the
Leave for Civil Appeal to the ruling of the District Court at Tel Aviv-Yato (Judge Ruth Ronen)
in C.A. 28811-02-16, Damti v. Mannkind Corp. (Oct. 12, 2017). In this unified appeal, the
Israeli Supreme Court upheld both lower courts, but avoided stating its substantive rationale.
2019] GLOBAL SETTLEMENTS: PROMISE AND PERIL 13
dually listed on NASDAQ and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (“TASE”). It
upheld a lower court that had ruled that the substantive law governing a dual-
listed company alleged to have breached its disclosure obligations was the
law of the foreign jurisdiction on which the shares are traded (which just
happened to be the U.S.).
38
Although the stock in Tower Semiconductor traded overwhelmingly in
the United States, the actual class in this case consisted exclusively of
holders of securities purchased on TASE (and not in the U.S.).
39
This result
seems strange at first glance: the claims of shareholders in a domestic
company who traded on their own country’s exchange are to be determined
by the law of a foreign jurisdiction. It is doubtful that Canada would do the
same (i.e., applying U.S. law) with respect to purchasers on the Toronto
Stock Exchange of a dual-listed Canadian company. But the result does give
a cause of action to Israeli citizens who once would have been included in
the U.S. class and is likely to produce outcomes that are consistent with the
outcomes of the U.S. litigation.
40
In short, the net result is to fill the void left
byMorrison.
C. The Netherlands and WCAM
Still a third way for plaintiff’s attorneys to respond to Morrison on
behalf of their foreign clients is to utilize the WCAM statute in the
Netherlands, which permits a global settlement class.
41
Of course, this will
It did, however, state that, “[I]n our opinion, the District Courts were correct in the judgments
that are the subject of the Motion for Leave to Appeal and the Appeal above in their rulings
regarding the application of foreign law.”
38. Cohen v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., C.A. 44775-02-16.
39. Cohen v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., supra note 37, at para. 3. Tower was
incorporated in Israel in 1993 and its common stock was listed on NASDAQ in 1994 and on
TASE in 2001. As of 2016, only 20% of Tower’s common stock was traded on TASE. Unlike
Tower, Mannkind was incorporated in the U.S. and was first listed on NASDAQ in 2015 and
later on TASE. Technically, this opinion is not a “formal” precedent (because the appeal was
withdrawn before the decision was issued), but the Israeli Supreme Court expressly stated that
it agreed with the lower court’s ruling and its interpretation of the case law. Gil Orion & Jana
Rabinovich, Israel: The Supreme Court Reaffirms the Application of Foreign Law to Dual-
Listed Companies, MONDAQ (Jan. 31, 2019), http://www.mondaq.com/x/777490/Securities/T
he+Supreme+Court+Reaffirms+the+Application+of+Foreign+law+to+DualListed+Compan
ies [https://perma.cc/9878-S2QL].
40. That is, if the U.S. class action settles, it is likely that the Israeli class action will also
settle. If the U.S. action is dismissed, it seems predictable that the Israeli action will fail also.
It is also possible as later discussed, that the claims of Israeli-based purchasers can now be
heard by a U.S. court pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction once the action is founded on
U.S. law. See infra notes 51–61 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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require that the defendants enter into a settlement, but that consent can be
induced. Although the Netherlands has no procedure equivalent to a U.S.
style “opt out” class action, it does permit a procedure that, when
aggressively implemented, can produce a functional equivalent to an “opt-
in” class action. Under Dutch law, a body known as a “stichting” (which
literally translates as “foundation”) can be transferred the legal rights of
shareholders to bring suit on their behalf, thus creating an aggregation
mechanism. The stichting has limited liability and essentially permits the
separation of ownership and control. It has regularly been used in the
Netherlands as a vehicle for litigation because it permits broad claim
aggregation. Each stichting has its own board of directors with full authority
to litigate, settle, and seek funding for the litigation from third party funders,
but the proceeds of any settlement revert to the shareholders.
Beginning in 2009, American plaintiff’s attorneys began to use the
stichting to litigate major securities cases. In that year, Grant & Eisenhofer,
a leading U.S. securities plaintiff’s firm, employed the WCAM statute to
settle a securities litigation against Royal Dutch Shell for $382 million —
then a record European securities litigation settlement. At about the same
time, Royal Dutch Shell settled parallel litigation in the U.S., in effect
splitting the plaintiffs into a U.S. class and a European settlement that
covered everyone else.
This outcome attracted wide notice, but bigger things were to come.
Following the 2008 crash, similar litigation was brought, initially through
several stichtings, against Fortis, a major Dutch and Belgian banking and
insurance firm that failed in the 2008 crash. One of these stichtings was
again organized by the same U.S. law firms (who did not appear in court, but
who largely underwrote the litigation and negotiated financing for it with
third party funders). The stichting procedure has, of course, one major
limitation: a stichting cannot represent absent parties who have not joined
the stichting. To reach a truly global settlement covering everyone, the
parties in Fortis turned to the WCAM statute. Evidently, Fortis (and its
successor, Ageas) were concerned that if they settled with the several
stichtings suing them, other plaintiffs would continue to come out of the
woodwork, each time seeking to better the last settlement.
The settlement initially proposed in the Fortis litigation under the
WCAM statute illustrated the problems that sometimes attend settlement
classes in the U.S.: some class members do markedly better than others.
Specifically, the Fortis settlement, as proposed, would pay more to “active”
class members (meaning those who had belonged to the original stichtings)
than to “passive” class members (meaning the absent parties picked up
through use of the WCAM statute). Although this disparity could be
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rationalized based on these plaintiff’s earlier involvement and individual
decision to opt in, the real difference may have been that most of those
brought into the “opt-out” WCAM class never learned of the action and
could not therefore object to the difference in payout. To its credit, the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals rejected the settlement because of this
disparity, but made clear that the class could be approved if this disparity
was eliminated.
42
Eventually, the parties complied, and the settlement was
approved in 2018.
43
The total settlement came to over $1.5 billion — nearly
four times the earlier Royal Dutch Shell settlement and a record for Europe.
A recovery on this scale motivates others (much as the reports of gold
at Sutter’s Mill sparked the Gold Rush of 1849). Unsurprisingly, similar
stichting actions are now pending against Volkswagen (for its evasion of test
controls) and Petrobras,
44
but these actions remain at an early stage.
Nonetheless, the basic WCAM strategy has become established and seems
to have two steps: (1) sue through one or more stichtings and demonstrate
the viability of plaintiff’s claims, and (2) once a settlement becomes likely,
convert the litigation into a WCAM proceeding so that the defendant can
obtain global relief and cover all persons who would be within the scope of
an “opt-out” class action. In effect, there is a gear shift from an “opt-in” to
an “opt-out” class, which is at the defendants’ discretion. Of course, all class
members have a right to opt out, but few exercise it (either in U.S. class
actions or WCAM actions). Important legal issues remain, including how
the parties can give legally adequate notice to persons around the world. But
the WCAM procedure has the clear potential to achieve a global resolution
(particularly in mass tort cases), and a stop in the Netherlands may become
standard in attempts by counsel to resolve all claims in a major international
case.
42. In June 2017, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals rejected the settlement, primarily
because of the preferential terms given to the “active” shareholders. Alison Frankel, Dutch
Court Approves $1.5 Billion Fortis Shareholder Deal – but There’s a Catch, REUTERS (July
16, 2018), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-fortis/dutch-court-approves-1-5-billion-fort
is-shareholder-deal-but-theres-a-catch-idUSKBN1K62OY [https://perma.cc/XSW2-J6M8].
43. Ageas was forced to increase the settlement from $1.33 billion to $1.5 billion to
equalize the payments to the passive shareholders. Id.
44. On September 19, 2018, the Rotterdam District Court ruled that, under traditional
principles of international law, it had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against Petrobras in a
collective action, and it refused to stay the action pending resolution of actions in Brazil and
the U.S. It did find, however, that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to certain non-Dutch
defendants. Rotterdam District Court Rules on Jurisdiction in Petrobras Collective Action,
STIBBE (Dec. 17, 2018), www.stibbe.com/en/news/2018/december/rotterdam-district-court-r
ules-on-jurisdiction-in-petrobras-collective-action [https://perma.cc/Z4UY-A4FW]. As a
matter of full disclosure, the author acknowledges that he has served as an expert witness for
Petrobras in this Dutch proceeding.
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D. Petrobras and the Expansion of Settlement Classes
As noted earlier, the Petrobras settlement expanded a litigation class
that the Second Circuit had rejected as overbroad into an even more
expensive settlement class, which the district court approved as fair and
reasonable. In fact, the expansion in Petrobras was fairly modest. Under
the settlement class, all purchasers had to have either purchased their
securities in the U.S. or settled through the Depository Trust Company. This
last category covered bond holders, most of whom probably did transact in
the U.S. (but some of whom who probably did not). In light of the Second
Circuit’s rejection of the first settlement, objectors claimed that this was
impermissible — both on the theory that those who purchased
extraterritorially should not have been permitted into the settlement class at
all and on the somewhat subtler theory that a “fundamental conflict” existed
between the interests of those who purchased inside the U.S. and those who
purchased outside, which conflict required at a minimum the use of
subclasses and different counsel for each subclass.
In response, Judge Jed Rakoff, the district court judge hearing the case,
answered:
What this boils down to as a practical matter is that certain
claimants who would have been unable to join the litigation classes
previously certified by the Court because of extraterritorial
impediments are now included in the settlement class so that the
defendants can buy “global peace.” In the Second Circuit,
plaintiffs are entitled to settle even entirely non-meritorious
claims.
45
Indeed, the Second Circuit has so ruled,
46
but (as the Judge recognized)
with some important limitations: First, “No class may be certified that
contains members lacking Article III standing.”
47
Second, if some claimants
have legally or economically stronger claims than other claimants in the
class, there may arise a “fundamental conflict” that goes “to the very heart
of the litigation.”
48
In this event, subclasses, each represented by different
counsel, might be necessary in order that a single class counsel not be
conflicted and subordinate the interests of the stronger claimants to those of
the weaker claimants in order to gain a larger global settlement.
As a result, if a class action sought to include persons who bought their
45. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 317 F. Supp. 3d 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
46. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 243 (2d Cir. 2012).
47. Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006).
48. Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 2013).
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securities outside the United States within a class largely composed of those
who bought inside the U.S., defendants could seemingly waive this legal
deficiency and settle even non-meritorious claims. Still, a “fundamental
conflict” might often exist between these different claimants that would
require subclassing and different counsel. In short, although defendants can
waive a “merits” issue such as “domesticity,” the “weaker” claimants could
not receive the same settlement amount as the “stronger” claimants. Rather,
these would need to be “structural assurance of fair and adequate
representation for the diverse groups and individuals”
49
within the class,
which generally means that separate counsel would be required for each
subclass.
50
In short, one may be able to outflank Morrison by using a settlement
class to cover extraterritorial claimants (such as, hypothetically, purchasers
on the London Stock Exchange), and the defendants could again waive the
“merits” issue of “domesticity.” But this takes one only so far. One would
still need to divide the class into domestic and foreign subclasses (each with
different counsel). These counsel would be expected to bargain for their
subclass so that the settlement paid a much higher amount per share to the
domestic shareholders.
Why did this not happen in Petrobras? The short answer was that the
differences between the various class members were relatively minor, and
the court found that sophisticated lead plaintiffs had endorsed the
settlement’s allocation of the proceeds. If these lead plaintiffs, holding only
securities purchased in the U.S., were willing to waive the issue of
“domesticity,” the court doubted that there could be any “fundamental
conflict.”
So where are we left? Petrobras shows that one can expand a
settlement class incrementally, but one may need to use a complicated
subclassing procedure. Moreover, defendants cannot be certain that these
subclasses with new counsel will reach the resolution (and distribution of the
proceeds) that they intended. In short, there is a large element of uncertainty.
But another possibility arises here that may be cleaner and simpler,
which curiously may have been encouraged by Morrison. Let us suppose
that the goal is to resolve the claims of investors in a British company that is
dual listed in New York and London. One could conceivably try to include
those trading on the London Stock Exchange in an expanded U.S. settlement
class by using a subclass with separate counsel (and with the defendant, of
49. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997).
50. For representative cases rejecting settlements on this ground, see In re LiteraryWorks
in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011) and In re Payment Card
Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2016).
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course, waiving the issue of “domesticity”). But this elaborate effort
attempts to achieve a result that would not even have been possible prior to
Morrison (at least if there was not substantial fraudulent conduct in the U.S.).
And it simply may be too much for U.S. courts to swallow.
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
One variation on the procedure used in Petrobras might be to file a
securities class action under foreign law as a parallel action in the U.S. court
and ask the court to hear these claims under the court’s supplemental
jurisdiction.
51
Effectively, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 codifies and expands the
traditional concept of pendant jurisdiction
52
and provides the district court
“the opportunity . . . to pursue complete relief in a federal-court lawsuit.”
53
These supplemental claims (i.e., the foreign cause of action) could either be
filed in the original lawsuit or could be added by an intervener.
54
Inherently, this action would share the same key factual allegations (i.e.
some alleged misstatements or omissions by the same issuer), and it could
be filed as a class action under U.S. procedural rules. This idea of parallel
actions under different nations’ laws has been discussed by academics,
55
but
only seldom attempted. The most recent effort in 2018 proved
51. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2018), once the district court has original jurisdiction
over some claims (hypothetically, a domestic securities class action), it also gains
supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.” Thus, the foreign claims need to share the same
nucleus of facts as the domestic claims, but that will seldom be an obstacle in a securities
fraud case. In the case of securities fraud actions, the claims will usually be substantially
related because the same allegedly misleading disclosures are usually released in both the
domestic and foreign market. Section 1367(c) then identifies circumstances in which the
court can decline such jurisdiction. See infra note 60.
52. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
53. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).
54. 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) expressly provides in its final sentence that supplemental
jurisdiction includes claims “that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
55. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal
Securities Laws, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 177 (2012) (arguing that foreign investors
injured by the same fraud as U.S. investors “might seek to have a U.S. court adjudicate their
claims along with those of investors who transacted domestically”).
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unsuccessful.
56
In In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig.,
57
the court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a securities class action under Israeli
law with respect to purchases on TASE. In part it did so because two similar
class actions against the same defendant were already pending in Israel.
58
But in addition, the court wrote:
[T]he United States has only a minimal interest, if any, in
providing a forum to litigate the claims of foreign stockholders
under foreign securities laws.
59
Other U.S. decisions have shown greater willingness to consider
foreign securities claims.
60
Of course, now that Israel has deemed U.S. law
to apply to cross-listed stocks that are traded in both the U.S. and Israel, the
first reason listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for declining supplemental jurisdiction
56. In Re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., No. 16-CV-7926 (JPO), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52084
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018). Other cases have also expressed doubts about exercising
supplemental jurisdiction with regard to foreign securities fraud claims. See Stoyas v. Toshiba
Corp., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 896 F.3d 933
(9th Cir. 2018). But in Stoyas, the court had already dismissed the U.S.-based action, so that
the foreign action was supplemental to nothing that survived. Another case has concluded
that supplemental jurisdiction may be sometimes appropriate (but only rarely) and generally
inappropriate. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 10-922 DSF (AJWx), 2011
WL 2675395, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011). See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
57. In Re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52084.
58. Id. at *55. The Court then cited Morrison for the proposition that “some fear that
[the U.S.] has become the Shangri-La . . . for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in
foreign securities markets”; see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270.
This suggests a general aversion to foreign law claims. See also Dar El-Bina Eng’g. &
Contracting Co. v. Republic of Iraq, 79 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
59. In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52084, at *56.
60. At least two recent decisions have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over foreign
law securities claims. First, in In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. C-07-
6140 EMC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20044 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014), the district approved a
settlement that included a large group of Israeli shareholders who purchased on TASE, and it
expressly stated: “The Court finds thatMorrison v. Australia Nat’l Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869
(2010), does not deprive this Court of its ability to approve this settlement which includes a
general release of all claims, including those of Israeli investors based on foreign law.” Id. at
*12–13. Although the Court’s rationale is not entirely clear, approval of a settlement could
generally be done under its supplemental jurisdiction.
Second, in Roofer’s Pension Fund v. Papa, No. 16-2805, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125885
(D.N.J. July 27, 2018), the Court held that it would “exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the Israeli law claim articulated in Count Four given the remaining federal [law] claims.” Id.
at *72 n.24. Roofer’s Pension Fund was not a settlement class and involved three counts of
U.S. securities fraud claims and one count of Israeli securities fraud. Because this case was
decided prior to the holding in Tower Semiconductor that U.S. substantive law applies in the
case of a dual listed stock, it should be even easier for a federal court today to follow Roofer’s
Pension Fund after that development.
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(i.e. that the claim is “novel or complex”) seems no longer applicable.
61
A
U.S. court can easily apply U.S. law to Israeli claims in both litigation and
settlement classes (although, to be sure, this might tend further to make the
U.S. a “Shangri-La for lawyers”).
62
Still, this analysis applies only to Israeli-listed stocks. In the case of
stocks listed, for example, on the London Stock Exchange, U.K. law would
presumably apply, and this might present a “novel or complex issue” for the
court under § 1367(c).
The bottom line at this time is that U.S. courts can consider foreign law
claims, but have divided in their willingness to do so. Nonetheless, one
special case is easier: settlement classes. Consider, for example, a stock
listed on both the New York and London Stock Exchanges. Plaintiff’s
attorneys in the U.S. and the defendant reach a deal on a settlement of the
U.S. claims, but the defendant also wishes to cover the London-based claims
as well. The plaintiff’s attorneys have no objection because a larger case
normally means a larger fee award in the U.S. Thus, a class action under
U.K. law is filed before the same court, which is asked to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the new claims. The court is further informed
by the parties that, unless a “global deal” and “global peace” can be
negotiated, the defendant is unwilling to settle. Now, the court has a
motivation to accept the foreign law claims, because in substance it means
less work for it, as a global settlement will typically eliminate a very messy
and time consuming case from its docket. One small detail, however,
detracts from this happy outcome: the settlement gives the foreign claimants
who traded in the U.K. somewhat less per share than those trading in the U.S.
will receive. This is a scenario that both hints at collusion, but also provides
credible reasons why a court might blink and exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction.
III. HOW TOBALANCE PROMISE AND PERIL
The foregoing analysis has suggested that the easiest way to fill the void
left byMorrison is through settlement class actions. These could be accepted
by a U.S. court pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction; or they could be
certified as a settlement class that expands upon a litigation class (possibly
61. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts have discretion to refuse to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.”
Ordinarily, Israeli law would present novel issues for a U.S. judge, but after Tower
Semiconductor, supra note 37, the U.S. judge need not face these issues as it has been
instructed by Israeli courts to apply U.S. law.
62. See supra note 58, citing language inMorrison.
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with subclasses if a “fundamental conflict” exists); or a Dutch court could
certify a WCAM settlement class. All these techniques have promise
because they give remedies to purchasers in countries that lack a class action
remedy. And they have peril because they invite collusion between
plaintiff’s attorneys and defendants.
But does one want to encourage such actions? Would Congress or the
courts respond with hostility because they believe that creating such a forum
in the U.S. would produce a return of allegedly abusive “f-cubed” class
actions? Or do they simply not want to allow the U.S. to become a forum
for global resolution because it might cause foreign issuers to flee the U.S.?
This Part will consider these questions under two headings: (a) Protections
Against Collusion, and (b) Should the U.S. Become a Forum for Global
Resolution.
A. Protections Against Collusion
To the extent collusion occurs, it typically involves an implicit deal
between plaintiff’s attorneys and defendants that subordinates the interests
of class members (here, the foreign class members). What protections are
feasible?
1. Subclassing and Independent Counsel
As earlier noted, if there is a material difference in the strength of their
legal claims between the U.S. class members and the foreign class members,
a “fundamental conflict” may arise that would require subclassing and
independent counsel. The same result should follow if two different classes
are consolidated or otherwise presented to the court for joint approval. The
policy goal here is to protect the class members holding the stronger legal
claims from having some portion of their settlement diverted to the class
members in the other subclass or action in order to produce a predictably
larger attorney’s fee award. This problem is more acute in jurisdictions, such
as the U.S., where attorneys normally receive a contingent fee award that is
a percentage of the recovery. Thus, the first rule should be that a different
counsel should represent each class or subclass. But that may not be enough.
Plaintiff’s attorneys naturally have friends and allies willing to help them.
Reciprocity is normal in many professions. Moreover, if the parties to a U.S.
class action settlement wish to add a foreign class to achieve a global
settlement, the law firm they invite to represent this new class may see little
downside. The actual work on the case will have been already done, and a
fee determined as a percentage of the recovery can be very attractive.
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Thus, a second safeguard should be to disfavor presumptively any
settlement of a securities fraud suit in which there is a material difference in
the amount received on a per share basis by the two classes. An absolute
rule would be too strict, because there can be relevant differences in
circumstances. Still, we can expect defendants to try and make the same
distinctions between claimants as was attempted (and rejected) in the Fortis
litigation.
2. Comity
Another means to this same end may be obtainable through the doctrine
of comity. Suppose there is a U.S. securities class action brought against a
company that is dual listed on the NYSE and Toronto Stock Exchanges.
Suppose further that the U.S. class action is settled and the settlement class
is extended to cover those who traded in Toronto. Alternatively, a Canadian
settlement class is presented to the U.S. court to be approved under the
court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Assume that the U.S. court approves both
classes (possibly because defendants insist that they will only settle on a
global basis).
But must a Canadian court respect this settlement, even if it
extinguishes claims that were then pending before it? In a contrast to a case
in State X that also resolves claims of citizens in State Z, the constitutional
requirement of “full faith and credit” does not apply in this international
setting. Only the doctrine of international comity does, and it is a doctrine
with weaker presumptions and more limitations.
63
Indeed, Canadian case law has clearly held that its courts are not
required to respect a settlement of a U.S. class action that settles claims over
which it also has jurisdiction. In Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of
Canada Ltd.,
64
the Ontario Court of Appeals did deny res judicata effect to a
U.S. class settlement where it found inadequate notice to Canadian class
members (even though the U.S. court had approved the adequacy of notice).
Arguably, a Canadian court might also deny preclusive effect to a U.S.
judgment or settlement if it determined that the settlement was not fair or
reasonable because it undercompensated the Canadian claimants. Of course,
if Canadian courts were inclined to let the Canadian action continue to see if
this action could obtain more, the incentive for defendants to enter into a
settlement class in the United States would be greatly diminished. But some
63. For an overview, see William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (2015).
64. (2005), 74 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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degree of uncertainty on the issue of res judicata may be desirable, because
it will deter defendants from seeking to impose the cheapest possible terms
on the foreign class. At present, there is at least a warning signal to those
settling Canadian claims in the U.S. that a Canadian court may review for
fairness.
B. Should the U.S. Become a Forum for Global Resolution?
Cases such as Vivendi in which plaintiffs won an initial judgment for
$9 billion sent shock waves through the international business community.
65
Arguably, Vivendi told foreign corporations listed in the U.S. that they faced
unascertainable and potentially catastrophic liability. Beyond simply this
economic fear, there is also a fear that international comity will be disrupted.
As one court phrased it:
[R]espect for foreign lawwould be completely subverted if foreign
claims were allowed to be piggybacked into virtually every
American securities fraud case, imposing American procedures,
requirements, and interpretations likely never contemplated by the
drafters of the foreign law.
66
Although this is a fair point, it has little or no application to two cases:
settlement classes and cases in which the foreign country (such as Israel) has
expressly adopted U.S. law. In a settlement class, where the defendant has
consented to the settlement class, there is neither interference with comity
nor an extortionate threat. The defendant is probably seeking to use the
settlement class to end the prospect of continuing individual or collective
litigation abroad.
Still, even if defendants have more to gain than to lose from expanded
use of supplemental jurisdiction, this does not itself supply an affirmative
justification for enabling the U.S. to become a forum for global resolution.
After all, allowing foreign claimants who traded abroad to resolve their
claims in the U.S. imposes costs on U.S. courts and increases their workload.
Why then do this? The following reasons may supply justifications.
65. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Vivendi was eventually reversed in light of
Morrison.
66. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 10-922 DSF (AJWx), 2011 WL
2675395, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2011).
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1. The Friendly Rationale
In first articulating the “conduct or effect” test, Judge Henry Friendly
suggested that Congress (if they had thought about it) would not have wanted
the U.S. to be used as a “base for fraud.” Thus, he wrote the “conduct test”
into U.S. law to enable U.S. courts to punish and deter fraud in the U.S.
where the level of fraudulent activity went beyond mere “preparatory steps”
and involved the actual “perpetration of fraudulent acts.”
67
How strong is this justification today? If there is a fraud planned in the
U.S., the Department of Justice and the SEC clearly have jurisdiction to bring
criminal or enforcement actions. Indeed, Congress specifically amended the
federal securities laws in the Dodd-Frank Act to give the SEC extraterritorial
jurisdiction if there was substantial fraudulent conduct in the U.S.
68
This
may weaken the need for private enforcement, as the U.S. already devotes
greater public enforcement resources than any other nation to the prosecution
of securities fraud.
69
Conversely, one could argue the reverse: namely, that because the SEC
has been instructed by Congress that it can pursue securities fraud
extraterritorially whenever “significant steps in furtherance of the violation”
are taken in the United States,
70
it may be consistent with this policy to permit
private enforcement to resolve both the domestic and foreign components of
a securities fraud in the United States. Here, it should be remembered that
supplemental jurisdiction will only exist if the proposed foreign action is
“substantially related” to a class action involving domestic securities fraud.
Typically, when two such parallel actions are proposed, there will have been
far more trading in the U.S. than abroad. Thus, U.S. courts are not being
asked to play “policeman to the world,” but only to resolve the remaining
strands to the domestic scandal in one integrated proceeding. Even if this is
not always true, U.S. courts are likely to limit (and should limit) their
exercise of the power to these occasions.
67. See ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (“We do not think [that] Congress
intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security
devices for export. . . .”); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.
1975).
68. See Section 27(b) (“Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018).
69. For a discussion of the relative budgets devoted to securities enforcement in the U.S.
and the U.K., see John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007).
70. Section 27(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018).
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2. Defendant’s Interests
The defendant in any case where there is both a domestic class and a
foreign class will typically be a U.S. corporation, and it must want an
integrated resolution if it enters into a settlement class. Other cases need not
be accepted, as discussed below. Such a resolution could spare the U.S.
corporation from additional years of litigation and legal expenses, and an
expedited resolution may allow it to move on from an embarrassing scandal.
Finally, small claimants in foreign jurisdictions without a class action
remedy may only receive a recovery if the U.S. permits such an action to be
certified.
3. Uniformity in Legal Standards
In the Tower Semiconductor litigation, the Israeli Supreme Court
appears to have believed that the most important consideration was the need
for a common legal standard in multinational litigation.
71
Thus, it deferred
to the foreign country’s law, even where the defendant was incorporated and
operated under Israeli law. Certainly, disparity in outcomes can be troubling.
For example, if a U.S. company won a securities class action in the U.S. but
lost in litigation brought by stichtings suing in the Netherlands, this
inconsistency might reflect the impact of improper factors (including a home
country bias). In general it seems likely that U.S. corporations and
shareholders would prefer a global resolution in the U.S. to a piecemeal
resolution in multiple jurisdictions over an extended period.
A similar legal standard also facilitates planning and compliance by
corporate defendants. Even in the field of securities regulation, there are
important differences among jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. generally
requires proof of scienter in secondary market cases (while Canada does
not); similarly, the U.S. has a periodic disclosures system, while other
jurisdictions (including Canada) require disclosure as soon as information
becomes material.
72
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that a settlement
class presented to a U.S. court for approval based on its supplemental
jurisdiction would hold the defendant to higher standards than applied in the
U.S.
71. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
72. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) the Supreme Court noted
that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading.” Such a duty to disclose arises
when the corporation sells stock and when SEC reporting obligations attach (such as when
Form 10-K or Form 10-Q require periodic disclosures). Some other nations, including
Canada, require disclosure of all material information at all times.
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The point here is not that there is an optimal rule as to which legal
standards should govern, but only that U.S. interest groups probably gain
from expanded use of supplemental jurisdiction in class action litigation.
C. A Proposed Balance
The most likely scenarios in which a U.S. court will be asked to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve claims brought by persons who did
not trade in the U.S. are: (1) settlement classes and (2) litigation classes
governed by U.S. law (such as an Israeli class action). In these cases, no
“novel or complex” issue seems likely to arise that justifies declining the
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1347 (c)(1).
73
Still, merely the absence of a “novel
or complex” issue does not imply that the case should be heard in a U.S.
court. Even if the case is “substantially related” to another case in which
class members did trade in the U.S., more seems necessary before the U.S.
opens its courts to the foreign action. For example, suppose a German
corporation that is listed on both a U.S. exchange and a European exchange
is sued for securities fraud, eventually settles with investors who purchased
in the U.S., and then seeks to achieve a global resolution by also settling
claims in the U.S. action brought on behalf of investors numerous who traded
in Europe. Before the court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction to take
this case, it should ask itself three additional questions:
First, did fraudulent conduct occur in the U.S. that gives the U.S. a
justification for accepting jurisdiction? This is, of course, the traditional
“conduct” test that was overturned by Morrison. Although such conduct is
insufficient under Morrison to permit the court to hear a litigation class, the
absence of such conduct in the U.S. should properly lead the court to decline
even a settlement — because the U.S. has no interest in acting as “policeman
to the world.”
74
Second, are there any signs of collusion? How was class counsel for
this settlement class selected? Is there a lead plaintiff who would satisfy the
standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? The corporate
defendant would predictably prefer to settle the foreign claims on a
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) lists instances in which a court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, even when a case is “substantially related.” Subsection (c)(1)
specifies that the court may decline a case that raises a “novel or complex issue” of law.
Foreign law will often present such issues.
74. Judge Henry Friendly fairly asked that courts inquire “whether Congress would have
wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be
devoted” to the case. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975). A
case in which no “significant steps” were taken in the United States provides little, if any,
justification for the use of such resources.
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“reversionary” basis, meaning that any unclaimed amounts in the settlement
will revert to the defendant. Because foreign claimants are less likely to learn
of the U.S. settlement, they are also less likely to file claims, thus leading to
a greater reversion to the defendant. Hence reversionary settlements need to
be particularly discouraged in this context.
75
Third, are there one or more pending actions in Europe involving
substantial claimants that this settlement class would undercut and preclude?
U.S. courts have no interest in “poaching” on litigation that was already
actively underway in Europe (or elsewhere). Indeed, in theMylan N.V. case,
the existence of pending actions in Israel was cited as an independent reason
for the U.S. court not exercising its supplemental jurisdiction.
76
Here, rigid
rules are undesirable, and the best approach may be for the U.S. court to
consult informally with the foreign court (much as was done in Silver v.
IMAX).
77
For example, if an action has been filed in Europe but lain dormant,
the foreign court might have no objection to its resolution in the U.S. by a
settlement class. Also, because few countries authorize “opt-out” actions,
the pending foreign action is likely to be an “opt-in” class or an action by a
stichting (or similar entity), with the result that carving out the small number
of plaintiffs in this action from the U.S. settlement class may be easily done
and probably represents the best accommodation to avoid friction between
the U.S court and the foreign court. In any event, because those claimants
represented abroad could always opt out from the U.S. settlement class, it
may make little difference whether the U.S. settlement class is defined to
exclude these litigants in pending cases.
CONCLUSION
This article opened with the observation that nature abhors a vacuum.
We have now surveyed a variety of means by which foreign claimants are
seeking (with some success) to re-enter U.S. courts, notwithstanding
Morrison. To be sure a case like Vivendi is no longer possible after
Morrison.
78
Nonetheless, the vacuum created by Morrison appears to be
under increasing pressure. Whether by means of an expansion of a litigation
class (as was done in Petrobras) or by use of supplemental jurisdiction, those
buying outside the U.S may in time be able to participate in the resolution of
75. For strong criticism of reversionary settlements, see the opinion of Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor in Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000).
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting existence of two pending class
actions in Israel).
77. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting $9 billion preliminary judgment).
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a class action in the U.S. (at least in a settlement class). Moreover, to the
extent these claims are not so resolved in the U.S., these claimants may turn
to a WCAM action in the Netherlands. The question thus posed for
defendants may soon become where do they want to resolve these claims (in
the U.S. or abroad?), because Morrison has not made them disappear.
For courts (both in the U.S. and the Netherlands), two issues stand out:
(1) how to prevent the settlement class from being abused (as it has
sometimes been in the U.S.
79
), and (2) how to permit an integrated resolution
of international claims without opening the litigation floodgates. This article
has suggested standards to these ends.
Exercising uncharacteristic prudence, this author has stopped short of
addressing the much more theoretical visions offered by other commentators
who favor a global class action. Some visionaries seem to want nothing less
than a form of World Court to resolve multinational litigation in a single
sweeping decision.
80
Others believe high-stakes commercial cases should
migrate to the United States or another country with a stable judiciary
because corruption is an endemic problem in the developing world.
81
At this
stage, this author prefers to be inductive, rather than deductive, and has
attempted to describe what is actually happening and not to offer an
ultimately desired end state. Even if corruption is a global problem that
compromises some judiciaries, little evidence suggests that it is a problem
that much affects securities litigation. Possibly, nations that are mature
enough to develop securities markets have already as a precondition largely
solved the problem of creating an honest, stable judiciary.
The bottom line is that incremental change appears to be coming. Even
if the obstacles to the creation of a new international court or to convincing
the U.S. to invite a potential flood of litigation are formidable to
insurmountable, practitioners are finding new ways to settle global claims.
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79. For a case in which the Supreme Court found the settlements class to have been
abused and warned against its “adventurous” use, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999) (rejecting “limited fund” settlement class).
80. For one bold such proposal, see Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court
of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014) (proposing court for foreign plaintiffs to
obtain enforceable judgments against American corporations who commit torts abroad). See
also Maya Steinitz & Paul Gowder, Transnational Litigation as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 94
N.C. L.REV. 751 (2016). The broader topic of mass torts is not within the scope of this article.
81. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008).
82. And the primary means is through a migration back to U.S. courts, because they offer
a combination of features—opt out class actions, the permissibility of contingent fees, and no
“loser pays” rule—that attracts plaintiffs to the U.S., much like Lord Denning’s moth. See
supra note 1.
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Morrison will not be overturned, but it is being outflanked. That should not
surprise.
